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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
R. lV. FRANK AND COMP ANY,
a Corporation, and UNITED
STATES FIDELITY &
GU ARAN TY CO., a Corporation,

Plaintiffs.

vs.

Case No.
12624

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH and JIMMIE J.
ARKOUDAS,

Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a claim for accident and injury benefits
under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
DISPOSITION IN THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Industrial Commission found sufficient evidence was introduced to establish a prima facie case that
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the claimant was entitled to 'V orkmen' s Compensation
benefits for injuries received as the direct result of the
industrial accident occurring on or about January 14,
1968.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek to have the Industrial Commission's order affirmed.
STATEMENT O.F .FACTS
The claimant feels that a restatement of the facts is
necessary. On April 13, 1970, the claimant filed for a
hearing and stated that he sustained an injury caused by
an accident arising in the course of his employment with
R. W. Frank & Company on approximately the 14th day
of January, 1968 (R. 9). The claimant had been given
orders at work to move some flammable paint from the
basement of R. W. Frank & Company's warehouse.
Each case contained six cans of paint and weighed approximately 60 to o5 pounds. The cases were on the
ground, and the claimant had to lift them and throw
them through a hole above his head where another employee would pick them up and carry them outside of
the building. While thus engaged, the claimant felt
something give in his back and, after finishing, he laid
down on a stack of plywood in a paneled shed in the back
of the premises. He continued to work that day. Approximately two days later, he saw Dr. Robert E. Morrow,
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an orthopedic specialist. Doctor lVlorrow advised him
that he should lay flat on his back and stay at home for
five days ( R. 26 and 27). The claimant then went to his
supervisor at work and repeated the doctor's advice (R.
'27). The claimant could not remember precisely what
he told his supervisor, but when cross examined at the
hearing upon whether he had reported the accident to
his employer, he testified as follows:
Q. You were aware that you were supposed to re-

port these matters to your supervisor?

A. I did.

Q. And when was it you talked with him, relative
to when this incident occurred?
A. This last one?
Q. Yes. How soon after?

A. \Vell, I would say two days, when I had, when
I saw-well, two, three days after, when I saw
Doctor lVIorrow. And then I had to lay-he laid
me up in bed for five days.
Q. And that's when you talked with whom?
A. The supervisor, Art Mickelsen.
Q. Is he in the room here?

A. Yes.
Q. And now, specifically what did you tell Mr .
.Mickelsen?
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A. I told him that I saw the doctor, and that I, he
told me to stay home for five days, flat on my
back, don't even get up to go to the bathroom.

Q. Well, what else did you tell him 1
A. That's all.
Q. So, you didn't at that time tell him that you hurt
your back while lifting this paint?

A. In those words, no. ( R. 33 and 34) . (Emphasis
added).
After his five days off, the claimant went back to
his regular work. He continued to work until September
25, 1969. At that time, he had gone to his employer, ,,Y,
E. Frank, and told him that Doctor Lamb had told him
that it was necessary that he have a back operation or he
would be crippled and that he would no longer be able
to lift. He asked his employer if he could have some other
job which would not involve lifting, and he was told:
"I am going to pay you for your four days vacation
you have coming, and I'm going to give you your
termination." (R. 37).
The commission submitted the case to a medical
panel. This panel consisted of Boyd G. Holbrook, M.D.,
Chairman, Chester D. Powell, M.D., and C. C. Hall,
M.D.; and in its findings of fact and conclusions, which
it reported to the Industrial Commission, found as follows:
"As a result of this study, assuming but not deciding
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that the applicant had the accident as alleged, this
panel finds the following:
( 1) The surgery on the lower back was necessitated
by the episode of January 14, 1968. The sur-

gery on the neck was not necessitated by the
episode of January 14, 1968.

( 2) As as reasonable medical probability, the time
lost from September 25, 1969, to May 4, 1970,

was a result of the accident. As a reasonable
medical probability, there was some lost time
shortly after the accident and the duration of
this time and the dates are unclear to this panel.

( 3) There is 15 % permanent physical impairment

from all causes.

a. There is 5 % permanent physical impairment
as a result of the degenerative process in his
neck and the subsequent interbody fusion related to degenerative changes and not caused
by, aggravated by or precipitated by this accident.
b. There is 10% permanent physical impairment as a result of the injury to his back and
subsequent surgery.
c. There was some pre-existing degenerative
changes in his lumbar spine not requiring
medical care, not disabling and not preventing his working and, therefore, not ratable
as a permanent impairment."
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At the medical hearing held by the Commission on
March 22, 1971, Dr. Thomas D. Noonan testified when
asked the following question:
Q. You have run into cases, have you not, Doctor,
where a person has had a back problem, aggravates it-by lifting or something-and then the
condition of the back subsides thereafter, until
there is about the same condition as it was, until
it's in about the condition as it was before the accident?

A. I have seen cases like that.
Q. Do you think there is a possibility that this is
one of them1

A. No, sir, I do not.
Q. Why not?

A. Because he apparently continued to have
trouble, he did seek medical help for the first
time in 15 years, and continued to have medical
help. Plus the fact that he did have some atrophy in his leg, that was present, that reversed
itself subsequently. He did have reflex changes,
and at the time of Doctor Morrow's examination,
that subsequently reversed themselves. I do not
believe he did get back to his pre-injury state.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
TIIEHE IS CREDIBLE, COl\IPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF
TlIE COl\Il\IISSION AND IT DID NOT ACT
CAPRICIOUSLY, ARBITRARILY OR UNREASONABLY.
Section 35-1-85, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states:
" ... The findings and conclusions of the commission on questions of fact shall be conclusive and
final and shall not be subject to review; such questions of fact shall include ultimate facts and the
findings and conclusions of the commission.... "
This statute has been construed by this Court in numerous cases to mean that the findings of fact and conclusions of the Commission will not be disturbed unless they
are capricious, arbitrary and without any credible or
competent evidence to support them. See Dalton v. Industrial Commission, 8 Utah 2d. 353, 334 P.2d 763
( 1959) ; Kennecott Copper Corporation v. Industrial
Commission, 23 Utah 2d 275, 462 P.2d 156 ( 1969) ;
Vause v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 217,
407 P.2d 1006 (1965). It is also the well established
rule in Utah, as set forth in the case of Fish Lake Resort Co. v. Industrial Commission, 73 Utah 479, 275
Pac. 580 ( 1929), that in reviewing an award of the
Industrial Commission, it will examine the evidence only
for the purpose of determining whether there is any substantial competent evidence to support the findings of
the Commission.
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The Commission found that the applicant "was injured as the result of an industrial accident on January
14, 1968, to-wit: 'moving paint from basement, felt sharp
pain in back, went numb,' and concluded that the applicant was entitled to Workmen's Compensation benefits
for the injuries received by the direct result of the industrial accident of January 14, 1968." (R. 151). There is
competent, credible evidence to support this conclusion.
Two days after the alleged accident, the claimant sought
medical help for the first time in 15 years and continued
to
medical help until he was discharged from employment with R. W. Frank & Company. The claimant
could not remember the exact date, but testified that on
approximately January 14, 1968, he was ordered to
throw cases of paint from the floor of R. W. Frank &
Company's basement through a hole above him. Each
case weighed approximately 60-65 pounds, and while
throwing them, he felt a sharp pain in his back, for which
he sought medical help approximately two days later.
The fact that the record is not clear whether any mention of the accident was ever given to his doctor does not
detract from the credibility of his testimony given to the
Commission at the hearing on March 22, 1971.
R. W. Frank & Company and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company belabor the point in their
brief that the claimant deliberately submitted false insurance claims to Aetna Insurance Company. The hearing
examiner and the commission passed upon his credibility
and they are the sole judges thereof. The reasons he gave
for this action are certainly understandable:

8

Q. In other words, you answered that in the nega-

tive, you didn't actually mean "no."

A. That's right.
Q. 'V asn't the fact that you put "no" there due to
your knowledge that you'd had this back trouble
over a period of years?

A. No.

Q. Now, it is customary when you make insurance
claims to not tell the truth?
A. In certain cases, yes, you have to.
Q. Why?

A. Well, when one company will not do anything
about it, the other one that you paid premiums
for should do something about it.
Q. \V ell, at that time, Mr. Arkoudas, in March,
1968, you hadn't filed a claim, had you, with the

Industrial Commission?

A. I knew it was no good in filing a claim with the
Industrial Commission.

Q. Why?
A. Because they wouldn't do anything before. (R.
49 and 50).
This action on the part of the claimant is not incompatible with the fact that an accident did occur on January 14, 1968. In light of all the circumstances, it is rec-
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oncilable that without the benefit of professional a<lYice,
he felt frustrated in his attempt to deal with what he felt
to be an impersonal, uncooperative government agency.
The plaintiffs, in their brief, cite United States Steel
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 8 Ill.2d 407, 134 N.E.2d
307 ( 1956), and Corn Products Refining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 6 Ill.2d 439, 128 N.E.2d 919 ( 1955),
to support their argument that in this case, the Commission acted arbitrarily in finding that a compensable accident had occurred on January 14, 1968. The issue of
whether an accident did occur is one solely of fact. The
well-settled law of this Court that the findings and conclusions of the Commission shall be conclusive if there is
any credible and competent evidence to support them is
determinative in the instant case. There are substantial
factual differences in the instant case and the two Illinois cases cited by the plaintiffs. It is significant that the
claimant remembers in detail the facts surrounding the
accident of January 14, 1968, and that approximately
two days after the accident, he sought medical help for
the first time in 15 years and that he continued to have
back trouble (which the medical panel concluded could
have been adversely affected by the January 14 accident) until he was dismissed from employment with R.
W. Frank & Company on September 25, 1969.
POINT II
R. W. FRANK & COMP ANY HAD NOTICE OF
THE ACCIDENT WITHIN ONE YEAR FROM
ITS DATE.
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It is uncontroverted that the claimant has suffered
a serious back injury which necessitated an operation
and for which he was dismissed from employment with
R. W. !1--.rank & Company. There is adequate evidence
to substantiate the Commission's finding that an accident
did occur on or about January 14, 1968. There is also
adequate evidence to show that the claimant's employer
did have notice of the accident within one year from its
date.
This Court has stated inlause v. Industrial Comm-ission, 17 Utah 2d 217, 407 P.2d 1006 (1965), that the
statute dealing with time limitations for filing claims
under the '"orkmen's Compensation Act should be liberally construed and applied to protect a claimant upon
any legitimate claim.

Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, et al., 104
Utah 436, 140 P.2d 644 (1943), is a case in which a fireman sustained an injury while playing handball with the
lieutenant in charge of the fire station at which the
claimant was injured. Under these circumstances, it was
held that the employer had notice that the applicant had
suffered an accident within the meaning of the statute
which is presently §35-1-99, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
The Court stated that it was the purpose of this statute
to give the employer an opportunity to make an early
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the alleged accident; to protect the employer against fraudulent claims and to give them an opportunity to remedy
defects so as to prevent similar accidents in the future.
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POINT III
THE CLAll\IA.NT'S FAILlJRE IN GIVI.NG HIS
EMPLOYER rl
NOTICE OF TlIE
ACCIDENT IS EXCUSABLE AS NEITHER
OF THE PLAINTIFFS 'VAS PREJUDICED
THEREBY.
As stated in 100 C.J.S., \Vorkmen's Compensation
i1452, it is the general rule of law in many jurisdictions
that the failure of an employee to give the required notice
of an accident is excused if it appears that the employer
or his insured was not misled or prejudiced by such failure. This is also the law in Utah as set forth in §35-1-99,
Utah Code Annotated 1953:
" ... provided, that knowledge of such injury obtained from any source on the part of such employer, his managing agent, superintendent, foreman or other person in authority, or knowledge
of any assertion by the injured sufficient to afford
an opportunity to the employer to make an investigation into the facts and to provide medical
treatment shall be equivalent to such notice; and

no defect or inaccuracy therein shall subject the
claimant to such reduction, if there was no intention to mislead or prejudice the employer in making his defense and the employer was not, in fact,
so misled or prejudiced thereby." (Emphasis
added).

Simpson v. Poteau Ice Co., et al., 237 P.2d 873

(Oki. 1951), is a case in which the claimant sustained an
injury to his back while engaged in lifting an engine.
The evidence disclosed that he had suffered an accident
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as claimed, but that he had given no notice to his employer. The claimant asserted that the employer had not
been prejudiced by the conceded lack of notice and that
thus he was excused from giving notice under the statute.
In that case, the Court held that the employer was prejudiced by a lack of timely notice because it was not given
an opportunity to make an investigation as to whether an
accidental injury was, in fact, sustained by the claimant
on that date. The Court stated that if a timely notice had
been given, the employer may have been able to establish
that no accidental injury was sustained. However, in the
instant case, it is clear that the applicant did sustain a
serious back injury for which he was ultimately dismissed from employment with R. W. Frank & Company. R. ,V. Frank & Company was not prejudiced by
the claimant's failure to give it a clear and concise formal
notice of the date of the accident. His supervisor was told
that the claimant was taking five days of sick leave on
the advice of Doctor Morrow whom he had seen two
days after the accident. W. E. Frank and Mr.
failed at that time to make any investigation of the accident.

CONCLUSION
The Commission's findings that the claimant was
entitled to 'Vorkm en's Compensation benefits for injuries received as the direct result of the industrial accident of January 14, 1968 is supported by competent and
adequate evidence. It is significant that the claimant saw
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a doctor for his back problem for the first time in 15
years two days after the accident occurred. The claimant'_s recall of the details of the activity which caused the
sharp pain in his back on January 14, 1968 ,is good. It
cannot be denied that the claimant has suffered serious
back injury which the medical panel found resulted
from the accident which could have happened on J anuary 14, 1968.
The claimant is not barred by §35-1-99, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, from receiving benefits under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. Notice sufficient to afford an opportunity to his employer to make an investigation into the facts of the accident was given to his immediate supervisor, Mr. Mickelsen. Furthermore, the
employer was not prejudiced by any defect of the manner in which the claimant put his employer on notice of
the accident.
Respectfully submitted,
R. Mont McDowell
Robert B. Goicoechea
Roe, Fowler, Jerman & Dart
Attorneys for Defendants
340 East Fourth South

Salt Lake City, Utah
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